Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 17

Issue 3

Article 8

7-1-2000

John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S. J., RESPONSIBILITY
AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
John J. Davenport

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Davenport, John J. (2000) "John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S. J., RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL:
A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers: Vol. 17 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200017332
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol17/iss3/8

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

BOOK REVIEWS

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, by John Martin
Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1998. Pp. viii and 269 + 7 page index. $59.95 (hardcover). $19.95
(paper).
JOHN J. DAVENPORT, Fordham University

Responsibility and Control is today the leading work in the compatibilist tradition. Its argument that determinism is compatible with responsibility for
actions, omissions, and their consequences is the comprehensive statement
of a theory that began with Fischer's 1982 article on "Responsibility and
Control." I Mark Ravizza joined this project in his first joint paper with
Fischer on responsibility for inevitable actions and events.' The main purpose of this new volume is to solve problems (highlighted by Peter van
Inwagen, Carl Ginet, David Zimmerman, Eleonore Stump, Randolph
Clarke, and others) with Fischer's recent sketch in The Metaphysics of Free
Will of the theory of moral responsibility in terms of "guidance control"
(which does not require the power to bring about alternatives).3 After a
brief overview of Responsibility and Control, I will consider a new problem
for the use of overdetermination cases in arguing for compatibilism.
Finally I will show how this problem applies to the authors' new analysis
of the origin of moral responsibility.
1. An overview of the book

In chapter one, the authors introduce their largely Strawsonian conception of moral responsibility and explain the direct and indirect threats determinism can pose to moral responsibility. They focus on the "freedomrelevant condition" of moral responsibility, i.e. the kind of control it requires
rather than epistemic conditions associated with voluntary action (p.13).
Following Harry Frankfurt's original critique of the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities (PAP),' chapter two presents the basic argument from cases
involving counterfactual and simultaneous interveners to "semicompatibilism" or the thesis that moral responsibility does not in general require the
kind of libertarian freedom or "regulative control" that is indeed incompatible with global causal determinism. This basic argument is now
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well-known to many readers. Consider a familiar case such as "Assassin,"
in which Sam shoots the mayor on his own, but could not have done otherwise because Jack had previously implanted a radio-controlled neurostimulator into Sam's brain and was ready to use it to force Sam to shoot the
mayor if he showed any sign of wavering (Responsibility and Control, p.29).
Since Sam is still responsible for shooting the mayor, the authors regard
such cases as evidence that the agent's moral responsibility derives from
features of the actual sequence that caused the action, rather than from alternative possibilities, even when these are available (p.37). The "guidance
control" that responsible agents must display in the actual sequence has
two aspects: it requires that the intentional process or psychological "mechanism" leading to the action be sane, or responsive in certain ways to reasons for action, and that this sane psychic process be recognized by the
agent as "his own," or as an expression of his agency (p.38-39).
In chapters two and three, the authors concentrate on improving their
account of the kind of reasons-responsiveness required by the first aspect of
guidance control. They argue that moral responsibility requires that the
mechanism from which the action flows (a) be "moderately" responsive to
reasons (meaning that the agent can recognize a suitable range of reasons for
doing otherwise, including moral reasons, that form a consistent and intelligible pattern) and (b) be at least weakly reactive to such reasons (meaning
that the agent would do otherwise at least some of the time she recognizes
such reasons). This account solves many of the problems with the earlier
model of guidance control in terms of "weak reasons-responsiveness," such
as the unwanted implication that agents who are only erratically responsive
to bizarre reasons can be responsible. Problems remain, which I cannot
explore in this short review, but this new account presents one of the most
sophisticated compatibilist models of sanity available in contemporary
moral psychology.
In chapter four, the authors are also largely successful in presenting a
new account of "guidance control" over consequences of our acts and
omissions, which provides a very effective response to van Inwagen's past
arguments that responsibility for consequence-universals or states of
affairs intuitively requires alternative possible consequences in this sense.
Fischer and Ravizza show that in a range of cases, including van Inwagen's
examples, what determines whether or not the agent is responsible for the
consequence is not whether it is avoidable or inevitable, but whether the
agent's act could have made a difference to the consequence in the prevailing environment (pp.101-112). To test this, we hold fixed the background
circumstances and omit other "triggering events" that count as causes of
the relevant consequence at the same time or after the agent's act causes it
(pp.113-120). Here again some problems remain, particularly in distinguishing between triggers and background conditions. But the onus will
be on incompatibilists to find any serious flaws with the plausible position
the authors map out.
The analysis of responsibility for omissions in chapter five includes
innovations based on this treatment of consequences. 5 The authors begin
with a "wide conception of omissions" according to which all failures are
omissions/ and then canvass two sets of cases: in the first, it seems like the
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unavoidability of an omission defeats responsibility; in the second,
unavoidability seems compatible with responsibility. Following
Frankfurt/ they argue that responsibility for simple failures to act is just a
special case of responsibility for the bodily actions that constitute such failures (p.133). They then analyze complex omissions as cases in which the
omitted bodily action brings about "a relatively narrowly specified negative consequence universal" (p.134). Just as for other consequences, they
argue that when the unavoidability of this consequence-universal seems to
defeat responsibility for the complex omission, this is not in fact because of
its unavoidability per se but rather because its absence is not dependent in
the required way on the absence of the agent's bodily action (p.135). This
new analysis yields a symmetrical treatment of responsibility for actions
and omissions, contra Susan Wolf's defense of an asymmetrical approach
(pp.148-150).8
In chapter six, Fischer and Ravizza also respond impressively to van
Inwagen's so-called "direct argument" for the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility by showing how simultaneous and counterfactual
intervener examples can be devised to undermine van Inwagen's key transfer principle in the direct argument. This analysis is impressive, but 1 doubt
it can yield a positive argument for responsibility-determinism compatibilism, because it cannot show that inevitability is compatible with responsibility when the "ensuring condition" operates in the agent's own path within
the actual sequence as a whole, as of course it would if universal determinism held. But this Achilles heel of Fischer and Ravizza's response is a reflection, I think, of a deeper difficulty about the use of overdetem1ination cases
to argue for compatibilism -the subject I turn to now.

II. The fundamental problem with overdetermination-case
arguments against PAP
Several different types of objection have been raised against the kind of
preemptive and simultaneous overdetermination cases on which Fischer
and Ravizza rely throughout their book. These problems can be distinguished by looking at the general structure of overdetermination cases.
Remember that the function of such examples is supposed to be to invalidate alternative-possibility conditions on responsibility by building our
intuitions that a given person P can be morally responsible for something X
(a decision, an intention, a bodily action, or the consequences of such an
action) even when X is inevitable or (equivalently) when possible worlds in
which X does not occur are inaccessible to P.
The persuasiveness of every overdetermination example, whether it
involves simultaneous or counterfactual interveners, depends on a division
of labor between two elements: one (R) which explains why the agent is
responsible for X, and another (I) which explains why X is inevitable. The
division consists in the fact that R and 1 are not in the same "pathway" (in
Fischer and Ravizza's sense), even if both are present somewhere in the
actual course of events as a whole. This anatomy of overdetermination
cases can be illustrated first with the simple sort of example that started the
disputes. In Frankfurt's "Neurologist" case, the inevitability-explaining

BOOK REVIEWS

387

factor (I) is Black, who is prepared to intervene by triggering electrodes in
Jones's brain to make him vote for Carter if he demonstrates any likelihood
of trying to vote for Reagan. X of course is Jones's voting for Carter. And
R is apparently (in the unanalyzed form of the example) just the fact that
Jones deliberated about politics, formed the intention to vote for Carter,
walked into the ballot box, and pulled the lever registering his vote all on
his own, without any manipulation. Of course the largest part of the compatibilist's task is to analyze in much subtler terms just what conditions
must be met by this process in the "pathway" leading up to Jones's actions
for it to make X imputable to him. All the Neurologist example tries to do
is show that an ability to bring it about that he refrains from X is no part of
the R that makes X imputable to Jones. This point requires that the R and I
factors do their work separately: the features of the scenario that make X
imputable and the features that make X inevitable must be different and
independent feahlres.
We can now distinguish three broad types of objection to such cases.
(1) Given this general structure, "Neurologist" and similar examples
leave it up to further argument to show that the relevant X for which the
agent is responsible and the X that is inevitable are the same X. This is the
main issue in the dispute about whether Frankfurt-type cases leave
"flickers of freedom."9 In chapter four on "Responsibility for
Consequences" the authors respond effectively to van Inwagen's argument that we are not responsible for event-universals we cannot avoid,
but only for event-particulars that we can avoid despite the presence of
preemptive or simultaneous interveners. This still leaves open questions
about other flicker-defenses of PAP, but since these are not addressed in
Responsibility and Control, I will leave them aside here.lO
(2) The structure of overdetermination cases also leaves it up to further
argument to show that the I-factor in such examples ensures the inevitability
of X without tacitly presupposing a kind of determinism inconsistent with
libertariaIl or agent-causal conceptions of freedomY This is the issue in the
ongoing debate about whether the signs that "trigger" intervention by counterfactual interveners imply a question-begging detemUnism. Fischer and
Ravizza do not pursue this debate in their book, but Fischer and others have
defended the authors' position in recent exchanges on this questionY
(3) There is a third and I think more fundamental kind of objection that
focuses on the R- element in overdetermination cases that are supposed to
count against PAP-principles. Fischer and Ravizza have done an
admirable job addressing objections of type (1) and (2) by isolating a single
set of R-features or responsibility-ensuring conditions that may explain
responsibility for the relevant Xs across a variety of challenging cases. But
although Fischer and Ravizza use overdetermination examples with great
acuity, such examples can at best show that responsibility for some X can
sometimes be locally compatible with X's unavoidability within a restricted
context of inquiry that limits the focus to the relevant X. The very nature of
overdetermination cases prevents them from showing us that the agent's
responsibility for the relevant X is ever ultimately compatible with determirlism.
Here's why. Such cases will intuitively persuade us that some X is both
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imputable and unavoidable only if we assume that the agent is responsible for
R, that is, for the feature (however interpreted or filled out) that makes his
responsibility for X intuitive. But this assumption will seem plausible to all
parties in the dispute only if they do not simultaneously stipulate that R
itself is inevitable for the agent. Nor can the same overdetermination
example focusing on X show us that R's inevitability would be compatible
with the agent's responsibility for R, as required for his responsibility for X.
Overdetermination cases instead rely on our presupposing that the agent's
responsibility for R is plausible, without inquiring into the conditions of
this responsibility, for their intuition-building work even to begin. For
instance, in "Neurologist," we have to accept that Jones is responsible for
deciding and intending to vote for Carter, before the example can demonstrate that responsibility and inevitability are locally compatible in the case
of Jones's voting for Carter.
The same holds even if we start from a different compatibilist account of
R in overdetermination cases. Take Frankfurt's willing addict, who in
Frankfurt's view is dearly responsible for taking heroin because he "identifies" with his desire for the drug (and with its compulsiveness). Here R is
explained in terms of the agent's higher-order (or authoritative, or deepself-expressive) will to be an addict.\3 X = the agent's taking the drug, and I
= the psychophysical addiction or the literal irresistibility of the desire. The
factors that make X inevitable and imputable operate separately, and the
example demonstrates that the agent is responsible for an inevitable X only
if we presuppose that he is already responsible for the higher-order will that
confers responsibility on X. This presupposition is not (and could not be)
demonstrated nor its conditions analyzed in the willing addict case itself.14
We find the same in more complex cases concerning responsibility for
inevitable consequences. Take "Joint Assassin," in which Jack and Sam
simultaneously shoot the mayor. Here the X for which Sam is apparently
responsible is "the consequence universal, that the mayor is shot" (p.117).
Fischer and Ravizza explain Sam's responsibility for this in a different way
than Frankfurt did with his addict: in their analysis, R is a complex structural feature of the situation, namely that Sam's act issued from a suitably
reasons-responsive mechanism and controlled the relevant outcome in
(roughly) the sense that in the given causal environment, minus other triggering events in other pathways (such as Jack's shooting), X would not
have come about had Sam acted otherwise. On this account, R is a feature
of the agent's path in the actual sequence: it specifically abstracts from the
pathways in which other simultaneous triggers operate in the total actual
sequence leading up to the mayor's untimely demise. But the I-factor that
makes X inevitable is just such a trigger, namely Jack's firing his gun when
and how he did. Now R and I do their work separately to ensure that X is
both imputable to Sam and unavoidable. Yet R makes Sam responsible for
X only if Sam is already responsible for R. And Joint Assassins cannot
show us that his responsibility for the factors that constitute R (on the
authors' analysis) is itself compatible with the inevitability of R.
Every successful overdetermination example can be decomposed in the
same way, and the same will be found in every case: the persuasiveness of
such examples presupposes that we accept the agent's responsibility for
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whatever feature R stands behind our intuition that he is responsible for
the inevitable X, and this in tum requires that the R and I factors work
independently. Compatibilist analyses of such examples have generally
focused on giving an account of precisely what features play the R-role, or
explain our intuition that the agent is responsible for the relevant X; they
have not shown that responsibility for the factors they pick out as R is compatible with R's inevitability. Nor could they use overdetermination examples for this purpose without falling into a vicious regress.
For instance, suppose Fischer and Ravizza wanted to show us that
Sam's guidance control over X (the mayor's death) in Joint Assassins
would still make Sam responsible for X even if we stipulated that the features of the actual sequence constituting this guidance control were also
inevitable for Sam. So they add some other factor F to Joint Assassins, such
that F makes R (the guidance control) itself inevitable. Then F would by
definition operate through the same pathway as R, not in a different pathway as the I-factor does in persuasive overdetermination cases. As a
result, suddenly the background assumption that Sam is responsible for R
-which seemed so innocuous as long as the focus was on his responsibility for the mayor's death (=X)- becomes doubtful, because we have
departed from the regular structure of overdetermination cases which
alone preserves the intuitive unison of responsibility and inevitability. We
would need some further reason not supplied in this 'Modified Joint
Assassins' case to show why it is still plausible that Sam is responsible for
X now that we stipulate that the moderately reasons-responsive mechanism leading to his decision to shoot was itself inevitable for Sam.
Suppose the authors tried to supply such a reason by inventing a different case (C) in which the features that play the role of R in Joint Assassins
now became the relevant X. Then in C we would have to have a new R
and I for this X, and the agent's responsibility for our new R would again
be presupposed and unexplained in C. There is no evident escape from
this regress for the compatibilist. Thus in any overdetermination case that
preserves the plausibility of the agent's responsibility for X, the possibility
will be left open that what explains the agent's responsibility for R is that R
(or some part of it) was agent-caused, or that R (or some part of it) was
elected from among multiple alternatives the agent had the power to bring
about. And either way, this means that the agent's responsibility for X will
not be ultimately compatible with determinism. Nothing will prevent libertarians from explaining responsibility for an inevitable X in any given
overdetermination case by saying that the agent satisfied libertarian conditions in bringing about (some part of) the features that play the R-role in
that overdetermination case. This amounts to subsuming such cases via
libertarian tracing principles.
Thus even if the worries about triggers and flickers of freedom can be
overcome, Fischer and Ravizza's examples will only succeed in building
part of the intuition the authors want: they may indeed show that agents
can sometimes be responsible for unavoidable event-universals, acts, and
perhaps some decisions, and hence that responsibility and inevitability are
sometimes locally compatible. But libertarians are already prepared to concede this much on the strength of traditional examples: a man who
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knowingly locks himself in a room is responsible for remaining therein,
even though he cannot do otherwise, because his predicament is a foreseen
result of an unmanipulated choice between alternatives. Libertarians modify their PAP-type principles with tracing principles to cover such cases, just
as Fischer and Ravizza allow that an agent can be responsible in a derivative manner for an action that does not result from a moderately reasonsresponsive mechanism if this itself is due to prior acts for which she is
responsible in the primary manner, because they flowed from moderately
reasons-responsive mechanisms (p.49-50). Responsibility for actions is thus
locally compatible with actions flowing from irrational mechanisms on
Fischer and Ravizza's account, but not ultimately compatible with nonreasons-responsiveness. Libertarians make analogous accommodations in
tracing principle revisions to PAP principles for decisions, intentions,
actions, and consequences. Thus if overdetermination examples show no
more than a local compatibility of responsibility and inevitability, then they
are no serious threat to libertarian intuitions about the ultimate conditions
on moral responsibility. Therefore such a "tracing-defense" against overdetermination cases is not ad hoc: it focuses on a problem that any theory of
responsibility must address, whether it is compatibilist or incompatibilist. 15
Ill. The New Account of Responsibility for Psychological Mechanisms

Since this tracing objection was presented in such a schematic form, it
will help to see how it applies more concretely to Fischer and Ravizza's own
positive account. In Responsibility and Control, the authors confront the
problem that a suitably reasons-responsive mechanism M can make us
responsible for an action, omission, or their consequences, only if we are
already responsible for M. Perhaps, the incompatibilist will say, we are
only responsible for M if it (or some crucial part of it) is agent-caused or
chosen from among alternatives we had the power to realize. 16 Indeed such
agent-causal and libertarian accounts of responsibility for psychological
mechanisms provide one clear way out of a familiar objection to Fischer's
earlier statement of his model, i.e. that suitably reasons-responsive mechanisms could be produced in the agent by brainwashing, neurological
manipulation, divine intervention, and so on. Libertarian or agent-causal
accounts would deal decisively with this source-problem by ensuring that we
are not responsible for psychological mechanisms deriving from coercion or
artificial interference. Fischer and Ravizza therefore had to describe and
defend an alternative compatibilist account of responsibility for psychological mechanisms.
They do this in the final two chapters of Responsibility and Control, which
layout an impressive argument for an "historical" conception of responsibility according to which the agent acquires the subjective conditions for
regarding himself as a moral agent (or a fair target of reactive attitudes)
through a process of acculturation and initiation into the language-game of
holding persons responsible and ascribing responsibility to oneself.
Through three stages -"'training,' 'taking responsibility,' and 'being held
responsible'" by others (p.210)--- the young person learns to become responsible for the sort of psychological mechanisms that can in turn make her
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responsible for particular acts, omissions, and consequences. The crucial
step is the middle one: "'The process by which an agent takes responsibility
for the springs of his action makes them his own in an important sense"
(p.210). Although I cam10t do justice to the details of their account, in sum
taking responsibility for mechanisms involves three basic conditions:
(a)

First, the individual learns to see her psychological states such as belief, desire, choice, and intention- as "the causal
source ... of upshots in the world" (p.210-11).

(b)

Second, "the individual must accept that he is the fair target of
reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this agency in
certain contexts." If the individual is not prone to philosophical
reflection, this need involve no more than a sense that it is "part
of our given social practices" for others to praise, blame, and
react to him as a result of his agency in some non-arbitrary
range of contexts (p.211).

(c)

Third, the individual's internal view of himself as a moral agent
constituted by these first two sets of beliefs must be based in
"an appropriate way" on "his evidence for these beliefs," which
will include recognizing the causal effectiveness of his choices
and actions, learning the moral language game by experiencing
social practices (p.213), and presumably learning that he can
conform his actions to social expectations. The training and
moral address of the community constituted in this languagegame provides the necessary evidence for the individual's selfascription of responsibility to count as rational (p.214).

The result of this process is that the individual becomes accustomed to
thinking of actions that flow from familiar kinds of psychological mechanisms (including not only reflective deliberation and prudence but also
habit and unreflective desire-gratification) as flowing from her. Acceptance
of action-ownership through mechanism-ownership becomes virtually
automatic unless there are special features of the case that could lead the
agent to exempt herself. Thus we do not take responsibility directly or
case-by-case for each particular mechanism-token behind each of our acts:
rather, "Having taken responsibility for behavior that issues from a kind of
mechanism, it is almost as if the agent had some sort of standing policy
with respect to that kind of mechanism" (p.216).
On the basis of this theory, Fischer and Ravizza argue that an agent cannot take responsibility for certain psychological mechanisms that are not
reasons-responsive, such as irresistible desires or subconscious suggestion
implanted by neurological manipulation (p.232). Similarly, although a reasons-responsive mechanisms could be directly induced by external interference, agents have normally taken responsibility for such mechanisms
only as "uninfluenced by such factors as subliminal advertising, direct
electronic stimulation of the brain, and so forth" (p.233). The complete
manipulation-mechanism will not be among those mechanisms for which
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the agent has taken responsibility, since even if she thinks she is acting on a
normal psychological mechanism, she is not: "In a case in which a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is implanted without an agent's
awareness, the agent has not taken responsibility for the kind of mechanism that issues in action" (p.234).
Finally, the authors consider whether an agent's standing policy of recognizing that she is ordinarily responsible for actions flowing from familiar
kinds of psychological mechanisms could itself be manipulated. They
admit, "it is conceivable that the individual's view of himself as an agent and
an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes be electronically implanted"
(pp.235-6). But they respond that such an agent would not have formed the
required view of himself "in the appropriate way," based on reality-tracking
evidence, as required by the third condition on taking responsibility (p.236).
Instead he would have been deceived, deluded, or tricked, and should not
be held responsible by one who knows the full story.
Despite its improvements, problems remain in this account. Drawing
on Robert Heinlein, Eleonore Stump has argued that an agent could be
manipulated into taking responsibility for a psychological mechanism M
that he knows has been implanted (perhaps by inculcating a false philosophical ideology).17 Her case seems to be analogous to Gettier-cases in
epistemology: the beliefs that constitute "taking responsibility" for M on
Fischer and Ravizza's account are not directly implanted, but are rather
motivated by staging the kind of appropriate evidence the agent needs to
be warranted in such beliefs, on their account. Such cases show that an
omnipotent manipulator could bring it about that the agent has true and
justified beliefs about his psychological mechanism that constitute "taking
responsibility" for it, yet not really be responsible for it. This also suggests
how hard it is to trace responsibility for actions to responsibility for mechanisms without tracing mechanism-responsibility itself to incompatibilist
sources that rule out manipulation.
But I want to focus on a more limited point: it is at any rate impossible
to use overdetermination cases to argue that the conditions of responsibility for psychological mechanisms are ultimately compatible with determinism. In chapter eight §7, the authors argue that counterfactual-intervener
cases give a philosophically reflective agent reason to believe that responsibility for psychological mechanisms is compatible with their being
inevitable. For in such cases:
the actual-sequence mechanism is, intuitively, the agent's own,
whereas the alternative- scenario mechanism is not. But the
Frankfurt-type cases are entirely consistent with causal determinism's being true. Another way of making the point is that causal
determinism in itself does not imply that all sequences are relevantly
similar to the alternative scenario of a Frankfurt-type case, in which
there is, for example, significant direct manipulation of the brain (and
thus the mechanism is not the agent's own) (p.228).
This is true, but it misleadingly implies that absence of direct interference
from other agents, machines, or natural events must be sufficient for the
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mechanism to count as the agent's own. Counterfactual-intervener cases
do not show this: they merely presuppose that the mechanism on which the
agent acts in the actual sequence (as opposed to the counterfactual
sequence) is her own, and invite the reader to go along with this assumption for the purpose of seeing that the agent can thereby become responsible
for some inevitable decision, action, or consequence. We cannot learn from
such cases whether the agent's ownership of (or responsibility for) the
mechanism on which he acted requires that the mechanism originated in
libertarian choice, or agent-causation, or neither. Thus if a Frankfurt-type
case is one in which the agent is by hypothesis responsible for what she
does 'on her own' in the actual sequence, it has yet to be proven that
"Frankfurt-type cases are entirely consistent with causal determinism's
being true," as the authors assume.
This is the deepest problem with Fischer and Ravizza's argument, and it
is relevant to a wide body of literature in which it has not been dearly recognized before. But this should not obscure the fact that Responsibility and
Control is full of challenging new ideas and ingenious responses to betterknown objections. Aside from being well-written and enjoyable to read, it
is the fruition of the entire tradition stemming from Frankfurt's 1969 paper,
which has become the dominant tradition in compatibilism today.
Although some amendments may be proposed, I doubt that a more systematic presentation of this tradition's approach will soon be attempted or
achieved. This makes the book essential reading not only for graduate
seminars on free will but also for philosophers interested in related problems about freedom and divine foreknowledge.
NOTES
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Moral Responsibility, ed. Fischer: 143-152.
5. Some of these were presented in John Fischer's paper, "Responsibility,
Control, and Omissions," Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 45-64.
6. They argue against narrower alternatives by suggesting that in cases
where other passive or active factors in the scenario would prevent John from
saving a drowning child if he had tried, "John omits to save the child; and yet
in neither case does he have the power to save the child." So in overdetermined cases, "the agents seem to omit to do certain things they in fact cannot
do" (p.125, notes 3 and 4). But I find this unpersuasive: John does have the
power not to omit saving the child. Had he tried fruitlessly to save him, competent speakers would say "John failed to save the child" but not "John omitted
to save the child." Trying and failing to do X is neither doing X nor omitting to
do X. Since he could have tried, he could have avoided the omission, even
though he could not have done X. Libertarians are bound to emphasize this
feature of the authors' examples.
7. See Harry Frankfurt, "What we are morally responsible for," in How
Many Questions? Essays in Honor of Sidney Morgenbesser, ed. L.S. Cauman, Isaac
Levi, Charles Parsons, and Robert Schwartz (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1983); reprinted in The importance ofwhat we care about: 95-103. esp. pp.l0l-l02.
8. The authors consider a different account favored by the asymmetrist,
according to which complex omissions are constituted by "an agent's not causing the relevant positive state of affairs," instead of bringing about a negative
state of affairs (p.146). On this analysis, it follows that the agent cannot have
guidance control of the positive state of affairs not caused, but the authors
argue that what matters instead is guidance control of "the omissions themselves" rather than the positive state of affairs they avoid causing (p.149). This
is intriguing, but it is not entirely clear that not causing is something over which
the agent could have guidance control without having regulative control
either.
9. This phrase was introduced by John Fischer in his book The Metaphysics
of Free Will (pp.I34-147).
10. There are various flicker defenses of PAP, and some focus on other
residual possibilities aside from the possibility of some different event-particular
occurring than the one actually brought about by the agent's action. These
strategies are not discussed in Responsibility and Control, but Fischer treats them
more thoroughlr in a forthcoming paper in The Journal of Ethics and in "Recent
Work on Mora Responsibility," Ethics 110.1 (October, 1999): 93-139. A full
analysis of these other flicker-objections, which I hope to attempt later, will show
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The Conscious Mind is certainly an ambitious book, and in many ways
an impressive one. Chalmers argues for a bold and unfashionable thesis.
The argument is often ingenious and ambitious, and at the (many) points

